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History bears out the genius of the Founding Fathers, who created a Government 
subject to law but not left subject to inertia when vigor and initiative are required.  
-  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 700 (1952). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the extent of Presidential authority has been argued since the 
very formation of our great nation. On September 17, 1787, in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, thirty-nine state delegates convened at the Constitutional Convention 
                                                          
* M.B.A., 2009, University of Baltimore, Merrick School of Business; J.D., 2007, University 
of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A., 2004, University of Maryland, College 
Park; Attorney Advisor, United States Social Security Administration, Office of Disability 
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There is no expressed or implied endorsement of the author‘s views or activities by the Social 
Security Administration or the United States government. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the contributions and research assistance provided by Victoria Chihos, a second year law 
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and signed the Constitution of the United States into law.
1
 At that time, the founding 
fathers intended to create an effective central government with a wide range of 
enforceable powers.
2
 The President of the United States was intended to be the chief 
protector and the representative of the populace.
3
 
The constitutional executive powers held by the President are broadly defined 
and vary in application. Chief Justice Marshall once wrote that, while the 
Constitution‘s ―means are adequate to its ends,‖ it is ―intended to endure for ages to 
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs‖4 
Therefore, this Article addresses, chiefly, the extent of the President‘s Executive 
powers to respond to threats to the security of the United States.‖5  
According to the Court in In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), ―[the President] is 
enabled to fulfill the duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that ‗he 
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.‘‖6 Specifically, the Framers 
intended the President‘s constitutional authority to be ―a continuation of the English 
and colonial tradition in war powers.‖7 In other words, the founders intended that, 
aside from Congress, the President should have the primary responsibility along with 
the necessary and requisite powers to protect the national security.8 The President is 
not required to ―seek legislative permission before engaging the military,‖9 nor does 
this create a limitation whereas the executive would ―have no power to commence 
war, or conclude peace, or enter into a final treaty without legislative approval.‖10  
The President must also have the latitude to act with ―decision, activity, secrecy, 
and dispatch.‖11 This completely autonomous executive decision is sometimes 
tempered by the constitutional principle of checks and balances, such as the 
congressional and judicial oversight on executive authority, whether via legislation, 
inherent powers, or vis-à-vis Presidential deference. Finally, this Article endeavors 
to answer the profound question that continually faces this nation, in both past and 
present crises: in an emergency scenario, whether it be a terrorist attack, health 
crisis, or a natural environmental disaster, how broad, or rather, how substantive are 
the President‘s enumerated emergency powers? 
                                                          
 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 156 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001) 
(1966). 
 2 Id. 
 3 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996). 
 4 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952). 
 5 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President‟s Constitutional Authority to 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or 
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 488, 489-90 (2002). 
 6 Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). 
 7 Yoo, supra note 3, at 252. 
 8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 9 Yoo, supra note 3, at 254. 
 10 Id. at 234. 
 11 Id. at 254. 
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Hamilton said it best: ―the circumstances which may affect the public safety are 
[not] reducible within certain determinate limits . . . there can be no limitation of that 
authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community in any 
matter essential to its efficacy.‖12 These varied occasions, such as martial law, posse 
commitatus, or immediate response, as envisioned by the Framers, were considered 
constitutional regardless of any limitations they placed on civil rights or liberties.
13
 
As long as the President followed his duty to faithfully execute the laws of the 
United States and to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, he operated 
within his constitutional authority.   
Within the perspective of Hamilton‘s admonition against limiting executive 
authority, this Article endeavors to generally discuss the historical and recent 
separation of powers issues arising with an active executive branch. Part II gives a 
brief overview of executive powers and their limitations: first discussing what 
actions are strictly executive in character, and then presenting Congress‘ attempts to 
question the executive‘s emergency powers and addressing the Judicial branch‘s 
struggle with finding a balance between judicial oversight and political question 
doctrine. Part III reviews specifically enumerated powers of the executive in 
emergencies where executive action is justified by the constitution, such as the 
evolution of emergency executive powers during wartime, force majeure, and, later 
on, public health emergencies. Posse commitatus, martial law, and immediate 
response principles are also discussed at length in this vein. In Part IV, the public 
health emergency section delves into the powers available to the executive, whether 
it be the President under his federal constitutional authority or the Governor under 
his State police powers—regardless of executive authority, how far may the 
executive go without overstepping the bonds of liberty.  
Ultimately, this Article posits that the broad grant of executive authority in 
exigent circumstances is warranted. ―With no time for ex ante deliberation, and no 
metric for ex post assessments, the executive‘s capacities for swift, vigorous, and 
secretive action are at a premium.‖14 The executive must be ready, willing, and able 
to act immediately following a national disaster such as a public health emergency 
where quarantine or isolation principles require the immediate segregation of the 
populace, presumably against their wishes.
15
 In such a case, where the executive acts 
in favor of the whole,
16
 he must not be unduly hindered by judicial review or 
congressional authority. The constitutional powers of the executive are constantly 
                                                          
 12 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 488; THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(emphasis added). 
 13 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn‟t True? The Tenth Amendment and 
Executive War Power, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 135, 149 (2001). 
 14 Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1565 (2009). 
 15 See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: 
THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH – NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY – APPROACH  
11 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/pemic_report.pdf.  
 16 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902) (―The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the definition of tyranny.‖). 
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changing, and are certainly broader than those envisioned in the days of Hamilton 
and Madison. The original constitutional authority reflected the concerns of the 
eighteenth century and was not ―well adapted to current conditions.‖17 
II. THE AXIS OVERSIGHT 
A. Executive Commander in Chief Powers 
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power 
of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in 
the definition of the executive authority. 
- Alexander Hamilton
18
 
 
The constitutional executive powers vested in the President provide him with the 
ability to speedily act in the nation‘s interest. ―Decision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the proceedings of one man, in a much 
more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number.‖19 The President 
is vested with these powers to maintain the common good on behalf of societal 
interest.
20
  
The Founders intended to create a government that was ―clothed with all the 
powers requisite to [the] complete execution of its trust.‖21 Congress is granted wide 
latitude in its authority over the military and the execution of the laws.
22
 Article I, 
Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to ―declare 
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land 
and water.‖23 Congress may also raise, maintain, and provide support for the army24 
and navy,
25
 ―make [r]ules for the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and 
naval [f]orces,‖26 and may ―[call] forth the [m]ilitia to execute the [l]aws . . . 
suppress insurrections and repel Invasions.‖27 Finally, Congress is entrusted with the 
                                                          
 17 Pearlstein, supra note 14, at 1551 n.2 (quoting Eric A. Posner, et al., Terror in the 
Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 56, (2007)). 
 18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902). 
 19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902). 
 20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902) 
(―Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to 
the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and 
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the 
security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of 
anarchy.‖). 
 21 The Federalist No. 23, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902). 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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ability to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to ―make all [l]aws which 
shall be necessary and proper‖ to execute these powers.28 These military powers 
provide Congress with control over undeclared, as well as declared, actions of war.
29
  
Conversely, Article II of the Constitution establishes the President as 
―[c]ommander in [c]hief of the [a]rmy and [n]avy of the United States, and of the 
[m]ilitia of the several [s]tates, when called into the actual [s]ervice of the United 
States.‖30 Article II, Section 1, vests the ―executive power‖ with the President, and 
requires that he faithfully execute the laws of the United States
31
 and dictates that the 
President must, to the best of his abilities, ―preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.‖32 
Article II, Section 2, entails the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President 
with the power to be ―Commander in Chief of the [a]rmy and [n]avy of the United 
States.‖33 This provides him with ―supreme command over the land and naval forces 
of the country,‖34 and he may order the armed forces to perform any necessary 
military duties as appropriate for the defense of the United States.
35
 The President 
may also ―dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as 
best to promote the safety of the country,‖36 and to ―effectuate the defense of the 
United States.‖37 These specific powers accorded to the President exist both in times 
of peace, as well as in times of war.
38
  
The President is also tasked to recommend to Congress consideration ―such 
[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.‖39 In any emergency scenario, 
the President may take unilateral action before seeking Congressional approval, and, 
when the opportunity presents itself, may subsequently seek verification from 
Congress.
40
 According to John Locke, this unrestrained power can be a concern and 
a potential threat to the liberty of the people. 
[T]he Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the 
Liberties of their People. For when their Successors, managing the 
Government with different Thoughts, would draw the Actions of those 
                                                          
 28 Id. 
 29 Telman, supra note 13, at 149. 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 497.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 498 (quoting Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att‘y 
Gen. 58, 61-62 (1941)). 
 37 Id. at 497. 
 38 Id. 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 40 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 304. 
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good Rulers into Precedent, and make them the Standard of their 
Prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the People was 
a right in them to do, for the harm of the People, if they so pleased; it has 
often occasioned Contest, and sometimes public Disorders, before the 
People could recover their original Right, and get that to be declared not 
to be Prerogative, which truly was never so.
41
 
Locke‘s reference to the ―prerogative of the people‖ rings true even today, as the 
specific, enumerated powers of the President of the United States have long been 
subject to dispute.
42
 According to Locke, the executive branch must be able to deal 
with unforeseen issues that arise, especially those which cannot be anticipated by the 
legislative branch.
43
 Where the law does not provide for all scenarios, the President 
must have the discretion and the latitude to act in a manner not closely proscribed by 
law, so long as it is exercised for the public good.
44
  
The Commander-in-Chief powers are based on the checks and balances system, 
subject to veto by the legislature, and subject to consideration by the judiciary. While 
it is true that Congress alone has the power to declare war on other nations, 
centralizing authority within the executive permits the ―unitary executive [to] 
evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize military and diplomatic 
resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.‖45 
According to Alexander Hamilton, a forward-thinking president can reasonably 
operate within the confines of the Constitution to protect the security of the nation.
46
 
A strong executive would be far more effective and competent for the nation than a 
weak one. 
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against 
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the 
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and highhanded 
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to 
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of 
faction, and of anarchy . . . It is not less essential to the steady 
administration of the laws.
47  
The far reaching powers of the executive branch are necessary to protect liberty 
against any attacks that would create chaos or anarchy within the government.
48
  
                                                          
 41 Telman, supra note 13, at 135 (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise § 166, in JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)). 
 42 See Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 377 (2011). 
 43 Telman, supra note 13, at 185. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 493. 
 46 See id. 
 47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902). 
 48 See id. 
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In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice 
Jackson laid out a three-pronged test that determined the validity of an exercise of 
executive power.
49
 First, ―[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.‖50 In this 
scenario, Congress has granted explicit congressional authorization for the President 
to act.
51
 When the President and Congress act together to address an emergency 
situation, the President's concurrent powers are at their zenith.
52
  
Second, ―[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a 
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain.‖53 When the President acts within ―a zone of 
twilight,‖54 he acts without congressional authorization for his actions and may face 
the ramifications for doing so at a later date. While acting under the ―zone of 
twilight,‖ the President‘s independent (as opposed to concurrent) powers are at their 
fullest.
55
 In this case, the President can act with ―all-embracing, swiftly moving 
authority.‖56 
The powers of the President within this ―zone of twilight‖ must be considered 
within certain factors. First, whether ―necessity‖ exists to authorize the President‘s 
exercise of powers.
57
 This increases the likelihood that a court will later favor the 
President‘s exercise of discretion.58 The President may act without implied or 
express congressional approval, but he cannot act without necessity.
59
 The greater 
the immediate necessity for Presidential action, the greater likelihood that the courts 
will sustain the President‘s continuing, independent authority.60 
Finally, the third standard for presidential authority arises ―[w]hen the President 
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.‖61 When the 
President acts in violation of an act of Congress, his power ―is at its lowest ebb‖62 
                                                          
 49 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-38; Yoo, supra note 3, at 193. 
 50 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635. 
 51 See id. at 635-37. 
 52 Yoo, supra note 3, at 193 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635). 
 53 Id. at 637. 
 54 Yoo, supra note 3, at 192-93 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637). 
 55 Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F.L. REV. 67, 
110 (2005). 
 56 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 613. 
 57 Davies, supra note 55, at 109. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id (emphasis added). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637. 
 62 Id. 
272 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 25:265 
 
because he acts against congressional authority. This creates substantial risk, both 
legally and politically, for the President, and his actions must be strongly 
scrutinized.
63
  
This seminal analysis by Justice Jackson in Youngstown has remained the 
foremost interpretation of the President‘s exercise of his executive powers.  Justice 
Jackson further noted: ―The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not 
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches . . . 
presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.‖64 Justice Jackson determined that the decision 
to deploy military force was reserved to the executive branch and remained among 
the President‘s enumerated powers only ―to the extent that the constitutional text 
does not explicitly allocate the power to initiate military hostilities to a particular 
branch.‖65  
The Court has long held that ―in the declared exercise of [the President‘s] powers 
as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger[, is] 
not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that [it is] in conflict 
with the Constitution or laws of Congress.‖66 Only ―except upon the clearest 
conviction that it cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the constitutional 
legislation of Congress‖67 could any Presidential action be set aside by the courts. 
Similarly, in the Prize Cases, the extent of the President‘s power to institute a 
blockade was ―to be decided by him‖ and would be left up to ―the political 
department of the [g]overnment to which this power was entrusted.‖68  
The President‘s constitutional authority flows from both his unique position in 
the constitutional structure and from the specific grants of authority assigned by 
Article II.
69
 It is clear that, based on Youngstown and its progeny, in an emergency 
situation ―the President enjoys full discretion in determining what level of force to 
use when addressing the emergency situation.‖70 The President‘s enumerated powers 
dictate that he be granted the power to act specifically for the good of the nation in 
such situations.
71
 This must be in the clear and informed manner that Locke 
proscribed, to prevent substantial ―public disorder.‖72 
                                                          
 63 Davies, supra note 55, at 110-11. 
 64 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.   
 65 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 495.  
 66 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). 
 67 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 133 (1866). 
 68 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490 (quoting The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 670 
(1862)). 
 69 Id. at 494 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982)). 
 70 Id. at 490 (quoting The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 
670 (1862)).  
 71 Telman, supra note 13, at 135 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)).   
 72 Id. 
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B. Judicial Oversight of Executive Powers 
The Supreme Court has historically supported the Executive‘s decisions and 
independent powers in emergency scenarios. However, questions still arise over 
whether the Court has continuing jurisdiction over the actions of the President in 
such emergency cases.
73
 According to Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, the 
Judiciary is not ―the overseer of our government.‖74 Justice Frankfurter also noted 
that ―[j]udicial power can be exercised only as to . . . ‗[c]ases‘ or ‗[c]ontroversies‘ . . 
. Rigorous adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function is especially 
demanded in controversies that arouse appeals to the Constitution.‖75 Furthermore, 
he agreed that, as the power of Commander in Chief is assigned solely to the 
President, the extent of his powers is decided by the President
76 
and not by the 
Courts.
77
  
The Court has held that the President has independent authority and the need to 
be free from interference in a variety of cases.
78
 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 
(1803), Justice Marshall found that ―the president is invested with certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is 
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. 
[B]eing entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.‖79 
According to Justice Marshall, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to address 
political questions, including, for example, issues of emergency health situations, 
foreign affairs or war making powers.
80
 ―Questions in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in 
this [C]ourt.‖81  
The Court has historically held that the President may ―employ [his powers] in 
the manner he may deem most effectual.
82
 In Luther v. Borden,
83
 the Court clarified 
that the President may ―call forth such number of the militia of any other [s]tate or 
[s]tates, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such 
insurrection.‖84 In the Prize Cases,85 the Court determined that the President, while 
                                                          
 73 Al-Ghizzawi v. Bush, No. 05-2378(JDB), 2006 WL 2844781, at *1 (D.D.C., 2006). 
 74 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 594. 
 75 Id.  
 76 The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). 
 77 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490. 
 78 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 582 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
 79 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).  
 80 Id. at 170. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Flemming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850). 
 83 Luther v. Bordon, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Here, the Court held that, whether state 
governments are protected by the Constitution under Article IV pursuant to the ―republican 
forms of government‖ clause is an inherently political and non-justiciable question to be 
resolved by the President and Congress. Id. at 32. 
 84 Id.  
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fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-Chief, was justified in instituting a blockade 
against the [s]outhern [s]tates. The Court ruled that it did not have the judicial 
oversight to question the President‘s actions, but must leave this decision to ―the 
political department of the [g]overnment to which this power was entrusted.‖86  
More recently, in Hamdi,
87
 the Court held that the President‘s power to act 
unilaterally falls squarely within the President‘s enumerated powers, and that the 
Court lacks the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.
88 
 According to 
Justice Thomas, ―[t]he power to protect the [n]ation ought to exist without limitation 
because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be 
necessary to satisfy them.‖89 The President is far better equipped to address 
emergency issues that may arise than the judicial branch; the former has almost 
unlimited resources and methodology for addressing emergent issues while the latter 
is limited to judicial oversight.
90
  
The Court cannot reasonably prevent the executive branch from accomplishing 
its constitutionally assigned functions.
91 
When circumstances arise that may 
endanger the safety of the nation, ―constitutional shackles‖ cannot be imposed on the 
President.
92
 The President must be free to act with somewhat unfettered discretion in 
areas.
93
 When the Court extends judicial review into areas ―where it does not know, 
and has no way of finding out, what serious harm it may be doing,‖94  this reduces 
the vested responsibility of the Executive.
95 
 
C. Legislative Oversight of Executive Powers 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people. 
   - U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers changed the division of powers that had 
traditionally been regarded as ―executive,‖ and instead assigned them to Congress in 
Article I, while expressly maintaining other elements as enumerated executive 
powers in Article II.
96
 For instance, the power to declare war was originally provided 
                                                          
 85 The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 641 (1863). 
 86 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490. 
 87 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
 88 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 89 Id. at 580. 
 90 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 493. 
 91 Id. at 490 (quoting Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 92 Yoo, supra note 3, at 270. 
 93 See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-94 (1988). 
 94 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. 
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 494. 
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to Congress and the Commander-in-Chief authority was expressly reserved for the 
President.
97
 Clearly then, ―[i]n the area of domestic legislation, the Constitution 
creates a detailed, finely wrought procedure in which Congress plays the central 
role.‖98 This does not appertain to situations where the President must act 
independently of Congress.
99
 
According to Justice Thomas, ―Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with 
regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every 
possible situation in which he might act.‖100 Congress‘s power to declare war does 
not place limitations on the President‘s ―independent and plenary constitutional 
authority‖101 regarding the use of military force. The reason for this is because 
otherwise, ―the President is left powerless at the very moment when the need for 
action may be most pressing and when no one, other than he, is immediately capable 
of action.‖102   
The President‘s war-making powers are historically subject to the whim of 
Congress.
103
 While a President requires Congressional approval to declare war on a 
sovereign nation, Congress may later chose to veto the President‘s declaration of war 
or deny the President the necessary funds to continue the war.
104
 However, in the 
case of an emergency action, such as a disaster occurring within a state whereas the 
President has to send in the National Guard to maintain order, the President‘s powers 
must be absolute and not subject to congressional or judicial scrutiny.
105
  
As Justice Jackson stated, ―[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.‖106 
Therefore, no statute can place any limits on the President's decision of how to 
adequately respond in an emergency situation.
107
 These decisions under our 
Constitution can only be logically made by the President.
108
 In United States v. 
Midwest Oil Co., the United States argued that: 
[t]he function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive 
can not exercise that function to any degree. But this is not to say that all 
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of the subjects concerning which laws might be made are perforce 
removed from the possibility of Executive influence. . . . The President is 
the active agent, not of Congress, but of the Nation. As such he performs 
the duties which the Constitution lays upon him immediately, and as such, 
also, he executes the laws and regulations adopted by Congress. He is the 
agent of the people of the United States, deriving all his powers from 
them and responsible directly to them. In no sense is he the agent of 
Congress. . . . Therefore it follows that in ways short of making laws or 
disobeying them, the Executive may be under a grave constitutional duty 
to act for the national protection in situations not covered by the acts of 
Congress, and in which, even, it may not be said that his action is the 
direct expression of any particular one of the independent powers which 
are granted to him specifically by the Constitution.
109
     
As such, the Executive is tasked with the authority to act for the national protection 
in scenarios where Congress cannot contemplate judicious action.
110
 Despite this, 
strict scrutiny proponents of presidential authority have claimed that, when the 
President acts to resolve an emergency scenario, he is not authorized to do so 
without the express permission of Congress.
111
 These claimants bring Section 2(c) of 
The War Powers Resolution,
112
 which states that:  
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) 
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by 
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed 
forces.
113
 
Congress included three mechanisms in the Act designed to ensure congressional 
participation in the war-making process.
114
 First, the President must consult with 
Congress, whenever possible, before introducing armed forces into hostilities, 
whether the conflict is imminent or actual.
115
 Second, the President must report to 
Congress within forty-eight hours of introducing such armed forces, detailing why 
the President sent the troops, describing the constitutional and legislative authority 
for the action, and estimating the scope and duration of the action.
116
 Finally, once 
the President has submitted his reasoning, he must terminate the intervention within 
sixty days.
117
 The only exceptions are, unless there is a declaration of war, Congress 
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authorizes an extension or Congress cannot meet due to an armed attack on the 
U.S.
118
 The Act also declares that Congress may terminate the President‘s use of 
force at any time by concurrent resolution.
119
 
The Executive branch has historically taken the position that the War Powers Act 
is unconstitutional. According to the Justice Department, ―section 2(c) of the War 
Powers Resolution does not constitute a legally binding definition of Presidential 
authority to deploy our armed forces.‖120 Moreover, this legislation is viewed by the 
Executive as ―incomplete or is not meant to be binding.‖121 No President has ever 
acknowledged the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, and no President 
has ever formally complied with its terms in emergencies.
122
 In fact, several 
Attorney Generals have held that Presidential action in times of emergency is 
expressly constitutional ―without specific prior Congressional approval‖123 as long as 
they are for the purpose of ―missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of 
protecting American lives or property or American interests.‖124 Attorney General 
Frank Murphy also stated in a speech to the U.S. Senate on the Emergency Powers 
of the President:  
the Executive has powers not enumerated in the statutes. . . . It is 
universally recognized that the constitutional duties of the Executive carry 
with them the constitutional powers necessary for their proper 
performance. These constitutional powers have never been specifically 
defined, and in fact cannot be, since their extent and limitations are 
largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances. . . . The right to 
take specific action might not exist under one state of facts, while under 
another it might be the absolute duty of the Executive to take such 
action.
125
 
Likewise, Attorney General John K. Richards once wrote that the Executive must 
act to preserve our national integrity and the interests which are entrusted to him.
126
 
―In the protection of these fundamental rights . . . the President is not limited to the 
enforcement of specific acts of Congress . . . [t]o do this, he must preserve, protect, 
and defend those fundamental rights which flow from the Constitution and belong to 
the sovereignty it created.‖127 Mr. Richards‘ modest views of the Presidency are 
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echoed by the founders‘ intent to create presidential authority that superseded 
congressional oversight when faced with an imminent crisis.  
The War Powers Act has a contentious and tumultuous history.
128
 
Notwithstanding the constitutionality of the Act, the President has the constitutional 
powers to act independently of Congress when necessary to protect the rights and 
liberties of the citizens.
129
 Any deprivation of the power allocated to the President to 
determine when to use military force in the case of an emergency would ―disrupt the 
basic constitutional framework.‖130 While placing unchecked powers in the hands of 
the executive branch could be dangerous to liberty with the unrestricted potential for 
abuse,
131
 the Court has stated that ―it would be difficult to point out any other hands 
in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual.‖132 
This power ―is conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must 
therefore be respected and enforced.‖133   
III. THE ENUMERATED EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
A. Emergency Powers 
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution sets forth that ―all 
powers not delegated to the government of the United States are reserved to the 
several states or to the people.‖134 The Articles of Confederation guaranteed to each 
state its ―sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and 
right, which is not . . . expressly delegated to the United States is retained by the 
states.
135
 These documents grant certain express, unalienable rights to the states to be 
free from interference by the federal government.
136
  
While these historical documents may be read as a check against the executive 
branch during an emergency scenario, the President does have some indirect 
authority over the matter.
137
 ―As Commander-in-Chief, [the President] is authorized 
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his 
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual‖138 
Moreover, the Constitution provides the ―power [to] the executive branch of the 
government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of emergency, 
                                                          
 128 Wars Powers Resolution, Pub. L.. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555. The President initially 
vetoed the War Powers Act, but Congress ultimately overrode the veto. VETO OF THE WAR 
POWERS RESOLUTION, 1 PUB. PAPERS 311 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
 129 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 514. 
 130 Id. at 495. 
 131 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 44 (1848). 
 132 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 591 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 133 Id. at 591. 
 134 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 135 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II, para. 1. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603 (1850).  
 138  Id. at 615.  
2012] EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE 279 
 
when other branches of the government are unable to function, or their functioning 
would itself threaten the public safety.‖139 
For example, in the rare instance where a state refuses to send in military forces 
to address an emergency, such as a revolt by the populace or a terrifying health 
quarantine, the President must realize his authority to act in these situations. No 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the nation.
140
 It is also 
expressed during these scenarios that ―the President should not report to Congress 
or, indeed, to anyone else.‖141 According to Justice Story, ―[i]t may be fit and proper 
for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion confided to the executive, 
for great public purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable 
mischief, by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws.‖142  
Presidential authority may be expanded during such times of emergency. In 
Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter dictated that ―a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a gloss on executive 
power vested in the President.‖143 Justice Frankfurter‘s concurrence established a 
three-pronged test for the legitimate expansion of executive powers.
144
 First, the 
Executive‘s practice must be systematic, unbroken, and long pursued.145 Second, 
Congress must knowingly acquiesce to the practice.
146
 Third, the Executive may not 
violate any unambiguous constitutional commands or statutes.
147
 
―The President‘s authority to deploy armed forces has been exercised in a broad 
range of circumstances [in] our history.‖148 Emergency situations sometimes arise in 
foreign, rather than domestic matters. ―The United States frequently employs armed 
forces outside this country—over 200 times in our history—for the protection of 
American citizens or national security.‖149 On August 20, 1998, President Clinton 
ordered the armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and 
Sudan because ―of the threat they present[ed] to our national security.‖150 President 
Clinton continued, ―when our very national security is challenged . . . we must take 
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extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.‖151  Here, President Clinton 
viewed his emergency authority independent of Congress and acted to protect the 
nation against imminent terrorist threats.
152
  
According to Justice Vinson in Youngstown:  
[w]hile emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the 
occasion for the exercise of power. The Framers knew, as we should 
know in these times of peril, that there is real danger in Executive 
weakness. There is no cause to fear Executive tyranny so long as the laws 
of Congress are being faithfully executed. Certainly there is no basis for 
fear of dictatorship when the Executive acts, as he did in this case, only to 
save the situation until Congress could act.
153
 
So long as the Executive did not create a basis for claims of ―arbitrary action, 
unlimited powers or dictatorial usurpation of congressional power,‖154 the Court was 
willing to overlook the matter of any ―executive tyranny‖ in handling emergency 
situations.
155
 
Another issue arising recently deals with the government‘s detainment of 
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism during wartime situations. The 
Court held in Hamdi that ―the [g]overnment‘s regulatory interest in community 
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest. 
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society‘s interest is at its peak, 
the government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be 
dangerous.‖156 According to the Court, the Executive‘s power to protect the nation in 
these circumstances should be unrestrained because,  
it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the 
safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles 
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is 
committed.
157
 
The Hamdi Court stepped beyond Youngstown, ruling that national emergencies 
dictate the existence of an executive authority, free from ―constitutional shackles,‖158 
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which would not subsequently give rise to the ―executive tyranny‖159 envisioned in 
Youngstown. 
Similarly, in the legislative record, Congress has explicitly authorized military 
involvement in domestic affairs when civilian authorities are overwhelmed.
160
 The 
Federal statute, entitled Use of Militia and Armed Forces to enforce Federal 
Authority,161 states: 
[w]henever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the 
United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United 
States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any 
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to 
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
162
  
This statute permits the Executive to employ the military in an emergency situation, 
specifically in the instance of a domestic uprising or a health quarantine.
163
 The 
doctrine of necessity has spoken for wartime emergency actions, as well as situations 
requiring the seizure of a private facility for clearing away dangerous conditions.
164
 
Seizing property may require due compensation under the ―takings clause,‖165 but 
does not encroach on the rights of the legislature.
166
 
Indeed, the judicial record is replete with controversy over the Executive 
emergency powers.
167
 In Ex parte Milligan, the Court noted that ―[t]he Constitution 
of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances.‖168 This statement is just the beginning of discourse against 
broadening Executive powers in emergency scenarios. The Court further reasons that 
―[n]o doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the 
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great 
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or 
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despotism.‖169 According to the Milligan Court, the government, acting within the 
confines of the Constitution, has ―all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to 
preserve its existence.‖170 When the executive branch failed to follow the necessary 
and proper procedures that were established by Congress, the President took 
―measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.‖171   
This result was intended to address the prevailing opinion at the time that, 
according to Justice Jackson in Youngstown, ―[the Framers] knew what emergencies 
were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they 
afford a ready pretext for usurpation . . . they suspected that emergency powers 
would tend to kindle emergencies.‖172 Justice Jackson argued that the Framers did 
not envision a constitutional conception of emergency powers for the Executive and 
did not intend to broaden these same powers except with Congressional or judicial 
oversight.
173
   
In more recent decisions, the Court has ventured off the historical path by 
refusing to impede the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers. In 
Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that, ―[w]here . . . the conditions call for the 
exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of 
the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-
making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or to 
substitute its judgment for theirs.‖174 The Court dictated that it could not reasonably 
intrude on delicate matters where the Executive has discretion.
175
 The Court also 
specifically referred to the Executive‘s emergency powers in Hibayashi, when it 
stated that ―it is enough that circumstances within the knowledge of those charged 
with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis 
for the decision which they made. Whether we would have made it is irrelevant.‖176  
Similarly, in Korematsu, the Court held that ―when under conditions of modern 
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be 
commensurate with the threatened danger.‖177 This is clearly applicable to a 
domestic emergency scenario. While a President must be permitted to act outside of 
the boundaries of congressional authority in an emergency scenario, the Court has 
dictated that a standing President cannot be permitted to act beyond the boundaries 
of reason.
178
  
The expansive ―rational basis‖ standard of Hirabayashi and Korematsu carries 
weight even as recent as 2011, when President Obama argued that he had the right to 
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engage in warfare through military operations in Libya.
179
 The administration 
contended that U.S. forces in Libya engaged in ―a limited and well-defined mission 
in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian 
disaster.‖180 President Obama argued that his actions were justified absent a formal 
declaration of war against Libya, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution of 
1973, and that his actions were ―in the national security and foreign policy interests 
of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign 
relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.‖181 The Court noted its 
dismay that the claimants were attempting to circumvent constitutional authority to 
―achieve what appear to be purely political ends, when it should be clear to them that 
this Court is powerless to depart from clearly established precedent of the Supreme 
Court and the District of Columbia Circuit.‖182 On this basis, the Court dismissed the 
matter.
183
 
This case echoes the result in Campbell v. Clinton, when several members of 
Congress sued over President Clinton‘s military campaign in Yugoslavia.184 There, 
the Court found that Congress had a broad range of legislative remedies and could 
have noted their objection to the Yugoslavian mission in that manner, rather than 
appealing to the judiciary that was precluded from entering the fray due to the 
political question doctrine.
185
  
B. Posse Comitatus 
The President has the power under the doctrine of ―posse comitatus,‖ or ―power 
of the county,‖ to call on the populace to assist in maintaining order or to apprehend 
criminals.
186
 In other words, the government can ask the community to engage in 
civil law enforcement.
187
 This concept has been sanctioned by Congress for the 
express purpose of ―maintaining order or law enforcement, so long as military 
personnel are not directly engaged in searches or arrests.‖188 
The Posse Comitatus Act was enacted in 1878, ―[i]n response to the military 
presence in the [s]outhern [s]tates during the Reconstruction Era‖189 and in ―the 
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perceived abuses of involving the military in various civilian responsibilities.‖190 
Congress intended the Act to prevent military personnel from executing laws or 
directly involving themselves in civilian law enforcement activities that were not 
under their auspices.
191
  
The origin of the Posse Comitatus Act
192
 arose from the traditional American 
dislike for a strong military role in society, the very crux of the American 
Revolution.
193
 When the colonies submitted their ―Declaration of Independence‖ to 
the King of Great Britain, they listed numerous complaints against the King‘s 
excessive use of the military.
194
 These grievances included the following: ―He has 
erected a multitude of [n]ew [o]ffices, and sent hither swarms of [o]fficers to harass 
our people, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, 
[s]tanding [a]rmies, without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render 
the [m]ilitary independent of and superior to the [c]ivil power.‖195 Our nation‘s 
founding fathers were rightfully afraid that the [e]xecutive branch, in the exercise of 
its constitutional powers, would act to limit individual rights against the consent of 
the legislature.
196
 After the close of the Civil War, the U.S. continued to occupy the 
former [c]onfederate [s]outhern states, but agreed to withdraw these troops during 
the 1876 election—thereby ending Reconstruction and setting the stage for the 
enacting of the Posse Comitatus Act.
197
 
As Justice Murphy stated, ―From time immemorial despots have used real or 
imagined threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating human 
rights. That excuse is no less unworthy of our traditions when used in this day of 
atomic warfare or at a future time when some other type of warfare may be 
devised.‖198 The founders intended for a congressional check against the misuse of 
federal forces to enforce the law of the land.
199
 This premise was established through 
the Posse Comitatus Act.
200
  
More recently, the military has become increasingly involved in domestic 
affairs.
201
 Critics have disclaim that the American populace has historically 
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displayed a ―strong aversion to military involvement in civil affairs,‖202 and that 
citizens ―applaud the military's entering into such popular battles like the fight 
against illegal drugs, but once the enemy becomes the average American under strict 
conditions of martial law, that applause would likely be quickly silenced.‖203 
However, according to the Code of Federal Regulations, ―The Constitution and Acts 
of Congress establish six exceptions, generally applicable within the entire territory 
of the United States, to which the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition does not 
apply.‖204 These exceptions, including the Force Acts, include insurrections within a 
state, with the permission of the governor, rebellions where enforcement of federal 
law is impractical, or an insurrection which impedes the state‘s ability to protect 
citizens of their constitutional rights, and the state is unable or unwilling to protect 
those rights.
205
 More specifically, one of these exceptions is an emergency authority 
by the executive branch to prevent lost of life or property during serious disturbances 
or calamities.
206
  
One of the most well known examples of the use of the emergency exception to 
the Posse Comitatus statute is the 1957 incident over the ―Little Rock Nine‖ at 
Central High School, in Little Rock, Arkansas.
207
 A federal injunction was issued 
against the Governor of Arkansas, which prevented the Governor from using the 
National Guard to prevent integration of Arkansas public schools.
208
 Under the Posse 
Comitatus Act, President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National guard 
troops.
209
 This effectively overruled the authority of Governor Orval Faubus, and 
prevented him from using the State National Guard to prevent nine black students 
from desegregating Central High School, in Little Rock.
210
  
At the time, the Attorney General advised President Eisenhower that ―the [P]osse 
[C]omitatus [S]tatute was not intended to limit the President's authority to deal with 
mob violence or similar threats to enforcement of federal law.‖ Nevertheless, the 
―Little Rock Nine‖ entered the school under the protection of 1,000 members of the 
101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army.
211
 Thus, Presidents have the authority to 
act to protect the public welfare and to secure the civil rights and civil liberties of the 
American people; even by force, if necessary.   
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The Posse Comitatus Statute was used by the executive branch to address 
conflicts that have arisen over the national security of the nation.
212
 Threats against 
national security have become more apparent with incidents such as the bombing of 
the federal plaza in Oklahoma City, the February 26, 1993 World Trade Center 
garage bombing, and the attacks on the twin towers on September 11, 2001, among 
others. It has now become of paramount importance that the executive branch have 
the authority to act independently if necessary to respond to the threats posed to the 
nation‘s safety.213 When President Clinton announced that he was increasing federal 
funding to fight a variety of terrorist attacks, many protested the President‘s actions 
for independently increasing the military‘s role in civil law enforcement.214 Despite 
the public furor, federal programs have continued to prepare for immediate incident 
response and recovery involvement, with an annual exercise conducted by the 
Department of Homeland Security each year to prepare for such causality.
215
 
C. Martial Law 
[Is] it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?
216
 
 
A third possibility for the President during a national emergency, where the 
President must overrule the inherent powers of the state, includes an act of martial 
law, ―the rule which is established when civil authority in the community is made 
subordinate to military, either in repelling invasions or when the ordinary 
administration of the laws fail to secure the proper objects of the government.‖217  
The Supreme Court has limited the definition of martial law to ―the law of 
military necessity in the actual presence of war. It is administered by the general of 
the army, and is in fact his will. Of necessity it is arbitrary, but it must be obeyed.‖218 
Interestingly enough, the ―term ‗martial law‘ itself carries no precise meaning. The 
Constitution does not refer to ‗martial law‘ at all and no ‗Act of Congress‘ has 
defined the term further.‖219 It is clear, however, that martial law extends beyond 
―war.‖220 If a widespread terrorist attack occurred, which severely incapacitated the 
governor of a state or rendered him unwilling to control the populace, the President 
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would be qualified to declare ―war on terrorism‖ and use martial law to control the 
government of that state.
221
  
The Milligan Court
222
 laid out express requirements for a declaration of martial 
law. The requirements are either, a condition of necessity, domestic war of some 
form, when the courts are closed,
223
 or actual war.
224
 However, one final caveat that 
the Milligan Court established, was that ―any exercise of emergency power by the 
President must be viewed in conjunction with congressional will.‖225 While 
obtaining ―congressional will‖226 is not always feasible, this facet of Milligan exists 
because ―just as emergencies do not create power and unenumerated powers do not 
mean undefined powers, the President's power to impose martial law must not be 
limitless.‖227  
Fearing an unlimited abuse of Presidential powers, the Milligan Court 
endeavored to check warrantless Presidential action in a time of conflict. Other than 
a condition of necessity, there are only very narrow circumstances where martial law 
may be established.
228
 An emergency must exist in to declare martial law.
229
 One 
view of what constitutes an emergency was illustrated in Texas during the Great 
Depression. There the governor of Texas attempted to declare martial law
230
 in the 
absence of an emergency, attempting to limit oil well production.
231
 The Supreme 
Court determined that ―[i]t is the emergency that gives the right, and the emergency 
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.‖232 Furthermore, ―[i]f a 
national emergency is so severe that the civilian courts are not able to meet and 
enjoin the declaration of martial law, then probably the emergency justifies the 
declaration.‖233  
While it is true that Congress has the authority to ―call[] forth the [m]ilitia to 
execute the [l]aws of the [u]nion,‖234 it is the duty of the Executive to ―take [c]are 
that the [l]aws be faithfully executed‖235 Thus, in an instance where the local militia 
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cannot maintain order, the President must declare martial law.
236
 This effectively 
overrules any congressional authority, and establishes police powers solely within 
the executive branch.
237
  
Martial law is not only applicable to the civilian populace, but can also be used to 
dictate the actions of the government towards those same civilians. According to a 
Department of Defense (DOD) directive, ―[t]he primary responsibility for protecting 
life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested 
in the [s]tate and local government.‖238 When conflict arises, the DOD has the power 
to overrule other responsibilities of alternative federal agencies to ensure the safety 
of lives.
239
  
In a specific domestic disaster relief, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency.
240
 ―While FEMA‘s primary 
responsibilities lie in the area of disaster or consequence management . . . they are 
neither trained nor manned to handle scenarios involving insurrection.‖241 Therefore, 
in such a scenario, under a declaration of martial law, the President can remove 
―FEMA from its primary role in consequence management‖ and mandate that ―the 
Department of Defense take over the process under a proclamation of martial 
law.‖242 
Where a declaration of martial law is a necessity, the realization is that 
congressional powers are abstained, and the President has the responsibility to act 
appropriately. A hypothetical example of the President‘s declaration of martial law 
can be seen in the movie ―The Siege,‖—a movie depicting a realistic version of 
martial law. In the movie, after numerous terrorist attacks in New York, the 
President declared martial law.
243
 By doing so, the President effectively permitted 
the army to go from house to house, searching for Middle-Eastern men.
244
 When the 
army discovered ―suspects,‖ it would gather these individuals and put them in 
detention camps, torturing and killing any suspect who objected.
245
 While ―the 
Siege‖ was probably not an accurate representation of what would actually transpire 
if the President declared martial law, the movie reflects some of the fears and the 
arguments against declaring martial law in any given scenario.  
                                                          
 236 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.   
 237 Id. 
 238 Davies, supra note 55, at 72. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id.  
 242 Id.  
 243 See Judith I. Brennan, Islamic Council Protests Timing of „The Siege‟, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 1998, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/25/entertainment/ca-16165. 
 244 See Roger Ebert, The Siege, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, available at http://ro 
gerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19981106/REVIEWS/811060302/1023. 
 245 Id. 
2012] EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE 289 
 
On April 29, 1992, a real life instance of ―the Siege‖ occurred,246 but the attacks 
were caused by American citizens rather than foreign terrorists.
247
 Following the 
acquittal of several police officers accused of beating Rodney King, mob rule broke 
out in Los Angeles and protesters began committing multiple acts of arson and 
violence, including the severe beating of truck driver Reginald Denny.
248
 Later that 
day, the Governor of California mobilized the California National Guard (CANG) 
and imposed a dawn-to-dusk curfew within Los Angeles and the surrounding 
counties. Over the next two days, at least two thousand CANG officers were 
deployed around the Los Angeles area.
249
  
On May 1 and 2, 1992, the President deployed four thousand federal troops to the 
area from Camp Pendleton and Fort Ord, California, federalized the CANG, and 
replaced several CANG divisions with United States Marines.
250
 The failure of the 
CANG to effectively maintain order was largely due to an ineffective aid agreement 
with the Los Angeles Police Department, an insufficient budget for troops, and most 
importantly, a larger than anticipated mob size.
251
 Eventually, almost ten thousand 
CANG soldiers were deployed!
252
 Several days later the riots faded, and throughout 
the course of the following weeks, the President ended the federalization of the 
CANG troops and disbanded the CANG.
253
  
At the time of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, civilian law enforcement agencies 
were unable to cope with the widespread rioting and were forced to rely upon 
National Guard and federal troops to help restore order.
254
 However, this large-scale 
incident has shown that necessity is a requirement for a declaration of martial law. 
What constitutes necessity is a question of fact.
255
 Scholars have noted that ―martial 
law is the public law of necessity. Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its 
exercise, and necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may be 
employed.‖256 While the Supreme Court has recognized that in various instances 
martial law may be necessary,
257
 there is only one requirement for a continued act of 
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martial law, i.e., sustaining martial law even after the imminent threat may have 
abated.
258
 That condition is a continued state of necessity.  
On December 7, 1941, following the surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii, the Governor of Hawaii suspended habeas corpus and placed the 
Territory of Hawaii under martial law.
259
 Upon this declaration, the Commanding 
General declared himself to be the military governor of Hawaii, and promptly shut 
down the courts in the state.
260
 He then established military courts for the sole 
purpose of trying civilians under martial law.
261
 The sentences imposed by military 
courts are not reviewable on appeal because military tribunals are not part of the 
judicial system.
262
 Several months after the attack, the declaration of martial law was 
slowly withdrawn.
263
 Eventually, civil courts were authorized to exercise their 
normal functions.
264
  
Two individuals were brought before the military courts after the status quo had 
resumed in Hawaii.
265
 They were sentenced by a military tribunal, subject to the laws 
of war instead of regular trial court.
266
 These individuals appealed, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Duncan v. Kahanamoku.
267
 In its opinion, the Court held 
that ―the phrase ‗martial law‘ . . . while intended to authorize the military to act 
vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of 
the island against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to 
authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.‖268  
In Duncan, the Court ruled that when courts were available (even when not 
utilized) for the trial of civilian matters, military tribunals, vis-à-vis martial law, 
could not ―supplant‖ the legal authority of these courts. The Court adopted the view 
that ―martial law provides a type of self-defensive use of force commensurate with 
necessity,‖ and allows the military ―to override some of the normal operations of the 
civil authorities, to provide for law enforcement and maintenance of order, without 
supplanting the civil judicial function.‖269 In sum, when the traditional courts are in 
operation and available to the parties, the use of military tribunals surpasses the 
executive branch‘s authority in a martial law scheme.270  
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Therefore, necessity must exist in order for the President to declare martial 
law.
271
 There must be a situation where all alternative options have been exhausted, 
and the consensus must be that the situation demands a declaration of martial law.
272
 
Once a declaration of martial law has been made, the military receives the power to 
―do all acts which are reasonably necessary for the purpose of restoring and 
maintaining public order.‖273 This includes ―restricting individuals‘ movement, 
imposing punishment through military trials, and suspending other fundamental 
rights.‖274 
D. Immediate Response 
This is no time for timorous action.
275
  
Finally, of all of the possible applications of Presidential authority previously 
listed, the concept of ―immediate response‖ is the most significant yet the least 
regulated. An immediate response scenario applies to extreme situations where the 
President must take immediate action in response to a disaster or terrorist attack.
276
  
After a severe disaster takes place, rioting, insurrection, or other serious disturbances 
are likely. As these incidents ―would hamper efforts to counteract the effects of the 
disaster,‖277 immediate action is crucial to ―prevent human suffering, save lives, or 
mitigate great property damage, even without prior authorization‖278 to counteract 
the effects of the disaster. This principle exists only within an exigent emergency 
scenario that ―overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities.‖279 
Immediate response was implemented when Timothy McVeigh bombed the 
Alfred P. Murrah federal building on April 19, 1995.
280
 The Oklahoma City bombing 
was the largest domestic terrorist attack in the history of the United States, killing 
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168 individuals and seriously wounding 800 more.
281
 The bombing marked the 
largest act of terrorism within U.S. borders prior to September 11, 2001.
282
 Due to 
the large scale of fatalities and injured, this attack on the federal building decimated 
the ability of the local authorities to immediately respond to the attack.
283
 However, 
the military was able to assist local authorities by providing ―medevac aircraft, 
ambulances, bomb detection dog teams, and various military personnel.‖284 Military 
―commanders at Fort Sill and Tinker Air Force Base provided this support under the 
theory of the . . . immediate response authority.‖285  
Another instance of immediate response necessity occurred when the largest ever 
terrorist attack on the United States transpired on September 11, 2001.
286
 Nineteen 
hijackers, under the aegis of a terrorist group known as Al-Quaeda, led by Osama 
Bin-Laden, took control of four airplanes.
287
 Two planes were each flown, eighteen 
minutes apart, into the economic symbol of the U.S., the World Trade Center twin 
towers.
288
 Two hours later, both towers collapsed.
289
 A third plane was flown into the 
Department of Defense Headquarters, the Pentagon.
290
 A fourth plane was crashed 
outside Pennsylvania, evidently intended for the White House or the U.S. Capitol.
291
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There were no survivors in any of the planes.
292
 The death toll for all four incidents 
reached almost three thousand victims.
293
 This series of tragic events became known 
worldwide as ―9/11.‖ In response to the events on 9/11, then-President Bush said, 
―I‘ve ordered that the full resources of the federal government to help the victims 
and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find 
those folks who committed this act.‖294  
The immediate response to the 9/11 attacks on the political, economic, and 
military might of the United States was necessary, both by law and by symbolic 
determination. Without the ability to implement an immediate response, the ability 
to ―survive‖ such a devastating attack, both physically and mentally, would have 
been impossible. Applying his executive immediate response power in the supreme 
case of necessity, the President demonstrated to the world that the United States 
could not and would not shirk from the protection of its civilians, and would not be 
overwhelmed by such an enormous tragedy even in the face of a major terrorist 
attack.
295
 
Finally, the necessity for an executive immediate response power exists within 
the category of natural disasters. The SARS H1N1 avian flu pandemic, the 1989 
Loma Prieta major earthquake in San Francisco, or the devastating events of 
Hurricane Katrina on Louisiana are all instances of when the principle of immediate 
response would be necessary.
296
 The National Response Plan (NRP), intended to 
address a wide variety of emergency scenarios, was enacted in December of 2004, 
by President Bush under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 in response to 
the events of September 11, 2001.
297
  
The scenarios addressed by the NRP include; a biological, nuclear, or 
radiological accident or terrorist attack; a natural disaster such as a tsunami, 
hurricane, fire, or earthquake; a malicious cyber attack; a food and agriculture 
disaster involving the nation‘s food and/or agriculture supply; an incident involving 
oil and/or hazardous materials and pollution; a biological health quarantine; or, a 
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terrorist attack not involving any of the above circumstances.
298
 The NRP likely 
would have covered the terrorist attacks of 9/11, intended to wreak havoc on the 
economic, military, and political might of the United States.
299
   
The NRP was developed to establish a unified federal resource which would 
assist in the preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major 
disasters, and other major emergencies.
300
 The NRP incorporates input gathered 
from numerous public safety organizations, and directed all major aspects of 
emergency planning into one cohesive unified discipline.
301
 It is intended to assist in 
the ―important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the 
United States; [to reduce] the nation‘s vulnerability to all natural and manmade 
hazards; and [to minimize] the damage‖ and assist with the recovery from any type 
of disaster that had occurred.
302
  
The NRP was also created to support the executive policies and decision making 
entities during the response to a specific threat or incident.
303
 It expressly encourages 
―cooperation, collaboration, and information-sharing across jurisdictions, as well as 
between the government and the private sector at all levels.‖304 It modifies existing 
agency emergency response plans at the federal, state and local levels, and 
formulates ―regional capabilities to ensure sustained operational readiness.‖305 The 
concept for the NRP arose out of the National Incident Management System, which 
created an initial national framework and implementation protocol and guidelines to 
be applied in the event of a terrorist attack, major disaster, or public health 
emergency.
306
   
The NRP has been successfully implemented during the events surrounding 
Hurricane Katrina.
307
 The hurricane made landfall in Louisiana on August 30, 
2005.
308
 Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale 
and one of the most costly and deadly hurricanes ever to hit the U.S.
309
 The day after 
Katrina touched down, then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, 
seeing that state executives were unable to handle the extent of the situation, invoked 
the NRP to permit FEMA to take control of the developing situation in the gulf 
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coast.
310
 The resulting damage to the coasts of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Florida, and Georgia from the hurricane was estimated at over $108 billion, with 
over 1,800 deaths throughout five states.
311
  
The effectiveness of the immediate response power may be called into question 
given the numerous and widespread allegations of civil rights violations and failures 
by FEMA to adequately control the events that took place in the aftermath of 
Katrina.
312
 The ACLU issued a comprehensive report concerning continuing 
incidents of racial injustice and human rights abuses, including discrimination and 
abuse on the streets, inhumane and dangerous conditions in the prisons, an ongoing 
housing crisis involving FEMA trailer parks and affordable housing in safe parts of 
the state, and severely limited mental health services for the public.
313
  In light of this 
information, it is still important to note that without the immediate response powers 
available to the President and FEMA, it is likely that the federal response would 
have been greatly delayed and many more lives would have been lost, and the 
damage would have been substantially more catastrophic. 
Despite the allegations of civil liberty violations during Hurricane Katrina, more 
recently, the Executive has successfully interceded during several natural disasters 
including the deadly tornados in Joplin, Missouri, which destroyed seventy-five 
percent of the city of Joplin and caused 160 deaths with nearly $3 billion in 
damages.
314
 The Department of Homeland Security has also played a lead role in 
federal response efforts following the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, efforts 
which continue to this day.
315
 
In sum, the concept of immediate response is an inherent power granted to the 
executive branch, and now subsumed by congressional authority to executive 
powers.
316
 Without these executive ―immediate response‖ powers, the principles of 
martial law, or even posse commitatus, would not be immediately available to the 
executive branch.
317
  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the broad pattern 
of presidential initiative continues to exists even in the absence of prior 
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congressional approval primarily in exigent situations calling for immediate action: 
―constitutional practice over two centuries, supported by the nature of the functions 
exercised and by the few legal benchmarks that exist, evidences the existence of 
broad constitutional power.‖318  It is necessary for the executive branch to have the 
express authority to immediately declare a national disaster or apply federal 
resources towards an incident without having to go through the traditional red tape of 
federal bureaucracy, much of which contributed towards the tragic conditions that 
arose after Hurricane Katrina.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDED EXECUTIVE POWERS  
ON PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
“Silent Enim Leges Inter Arma.” (Law stands mute in the midst of arms.)  
Marcus Tullius Cicero 
As demonstrated above, the executive powers are subject to certain checks and 
balances. However, an active executive may credibly stretch these powers given 
exigent circumstances, most particularly those requiring immediate response to a 
crisis.
319
 There are none more necessary or imminent than in a public health 
emergency scenario, where the smallest delay can cause extensive loss of life.   
In some circumstances, the executive can tread more cautiously and take the time 
to carefully document and justify his actions. But in a health emergency scenario, the 
fastest and most direct action is often the most effective. In such a case, the public, 
despite knowing that the President‘s actions infringe upon the liberties of the few for 
the good of the many, may nonetheless yield without much conflict. One of the 
foremost experts on public health ethics of our times, Catholic University law 
professor, George P. Smith II,
320
 summed up the issue of the willingness for 
restriction of civil liberties:   
[w]hat remains is for the vox populi to be educated as to their 
responsibilities of citizenship which demand—in times of national and 
public health emergencies—that the common good be protected and 
secured, and further, that this responsibility justifies the curtailment of 
basic liberties and rights during the time of the emergency. The failure to 
recognize or accept this responsibility courts the collapse of society 
itself.
321
 
Professor Smith notes that when a health epidemic breaks out, the public is best 
suited by allowing the executive to do what it does best, even with the prospect of 
having to comply with isolation or quarantine measures, as failure to do so is to 
                                                          
 318 Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 
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facilitate many more injuries or deaths, i.e., to ―court the collapse of society 
itself.‖322 To gain a better understanding of the circumstances within which the 
executive may be required to take immediate action, this Article addresses the 
judicial and legislative history of the health pandemics that once faced or continue to 
face our nation.  
A. Emergence of Related Cases 
To begin with, Article 1, Section 10, of the U.S. Constitution provides that states 
may promulgate and enforce inspection laws.
323
 This provision has long been 
thought to give states the power to quarantine articles of commerce suspected of 
spreading inspection.
324
 Quarantine is one of the oldest means of regulating for the 
public health.
325
 As early as 1796, the federal government ―enacted the first federal 
quarantine law in response to a yellow fever epidemic.‖326 That law gave the 
President the power to assist states in enforcing their own quarantine laws.
327
 In 
1799, the Act ―was repealed and replaced with one establishing the first federal 
inspection system for maritime quarantines.‖328 By 1824, the Supreme Court in 
Gibbons v. Ogden recognized the police powers of the state to compel isolation and 
quarantine ―to provide for the health of its citizens.‖329  
Thereafter, throughout the nineteenth century, the states and federal government 
undertook an increasingly prominent role in implementing maritime quarantines for 
the safety of the nation. Beginning with Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a 
Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, the Court held that the states have the 
power to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the 
health of their inhabitants.
330
 And that ―until Congress has exercised its power on the 
subject, such state quarantine laws and state laws for the purpose of preventing, 
eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, are not 
repugnant to the Constitution.‖331 More specifically, the Compagnie Court 
recognized that state quarantine powers could be displaced by ―affirmative action‖ 
from Congress and substituted by congress thereby correcting any ―injustifiable and 
oppressive exercise of power by state legislation.‖332 
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Only a few years later, the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
333
 deemed the 
state powers to impose quarantine as ―the police power,‖334 and recognized that 
constitutional liberties do not import the absolute right to be free from restraint.
335
   
Indeed, in situations of necessity, the common good, including the ―safety, health, 
peace, good order, and morals of the community,‖ must overrule the individual 
enjoyment of liberty. This is ―liberty regulated by law.‖336 The Jacobson Court 
implicitly recognized that state or executive powers may be arbitrarily or 
capriciously imposed, and hastened to check the speed at which these actions 
occurred:  
in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving 
the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of 
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be 
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable 
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.
337
   
Historically, the Court has ―distinctly recognized the authority of a [s]tate to 
enact quarantine laws and ‗health laws of every description;‘ indeed, all laws that 
relate to matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary 
operation affect the people of other [s]tates.‖338 The state may broadly apply such 
police powers only insofar as the law does not contravene the constitutional rights or 
federal authority over such matters.
339
 As such, in the broader case of a public health 
emergency, it is ―the duty of the constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the 
welfare, comfort and safety of the many, and not permit the interests of the many to 
be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few.‖340   
While necessity may reasonably require a community to protect itself against an 
epidemic threatening the safety of all, the Court disclaimed that it would not hesitate 
to step in and adjudicate against ―a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the 
fundamental law‖ which has no real or substantial relation to the ―public health, the 
public morals or the public safety.‖341 Conversely, the Court noted that it would not 
―invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in 
order to enforce that law.‖342 Along with Compagnie, Jacobson helped pave the way 
for later federal national emergency legislation and intervention. 
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B. Public Health Legislation 
Several pieces of legislation have been enacted for the purpose of dealing with a 
health pandemic. In 1976, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act to 
formally limit the emergency powers of the president during a state of emergency.
343
 
The Executive is authorized to declare a national emergency but must specify the 
statutory authorities to be used under such declaration, report them to Congress, and 
publish this information in the Federal Register.
344
 Congress can terminate the 
emergency, and it also may be revoked by proclamation of the President.
345
 The U.S. 
has been under a state of national emergency since 9/11.
346
 
Under the Stafford Act of 1988,
347
 Congress has also previously sanctioned the 
President to commit federal troops to assist state governments during emergencies, 
as long as the work is ―essential for the preservation of life and property.‖348 The 
Stafford Act conditions the President‘s power upon the existence of a natural disaster 
and the permission from the governor of the state requesting aid.
349
 In the case of a 
―major disaster‖ or ―emergency‖ the Stafford Act allows the President to coordinate 
administration of disaster relief through FEMA or other government agencies.
350
 The 
state must implement its emergency plan before the President may invoke these 
emergency powers.
351
 However, in the case where the emergency involves ―federal 
primary responsibility‖ such as one occurring on a federal property, the President 
may overrule state action.
352
  
The Public Health Service Act,
353
 enacted in 1994, grants the executive unilateral 
authorization to declare a national emergency and allows broad discretion during a 
public health emergency such as making grants, entering into contracts, investigating 
the cause, treatment and prevention of a disease or disorder causing the emergency, 
and authorizing emergency use of unapproved products or approved products for 
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unauthorized uses.
354
 Quarantine may also be used as ―necessary‖ to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.
355
  President Obama 
used this Act to declare a Public Health Emergency for the H1N1 pandemic during 
2009.
356
  
In 2001, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (―MSEHPA‖) was 
drafted to address new health threats, such as SARS and influenza.
357
 This important 
piece of model legislation was intended to standardize and modernize state public 
health legislation which would thereby enable state actors to take immediate action 
in the event of a disaster.
358
 The MSEHPA established provisions for reporting 
diseases and other health conditions.
359
 It broadly defined the circumstances under 
which a public health emergency may be declared or whether compulsory actions 
may be undertaken, and permitted the same ―when the situation calls for prompt and 
timely action.‖360 The MSEHPA also defined and established mechanisms for 
enforcement of the states‘ compulsory powers through quarantine or isolation.361 A 
majority of states have enacted legislation based on the MSEHPA.
362
    
On November 1, 2005, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was 
released by then-President Bush to prepare the nation‘s response during an influenza 
pandemic.
363
 The Strategy set forth distribution protocols for the limited availability 
of vaccine and antiviral medication during the outbreak.
364
 President Bush also 
signed the National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, which 
created an ―Enduring Constitutional Government‖ in the case the federal government 
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was drastically affected.
365
 This legislature established a ―cooperative effort‖ as a 
matter of comity among the three branches of federal government, coordinated by 
the President.
366
 
Emergency legislation has also been passed to control communicable diseases,
367
 
such as preventing the interstate spread of diseases;
368
 preventing the introduction, 
spread or transmission of foreign diseases;
369
 establishing the list of quarantinable 
communicable diseases and penalties for violating quarantine regulations;
370
 
precluding aliens with communicable public health diseases from entry into the 
U.S.;
371
 authorizing the cessation, cancelation or grounding of flights or restricting 
airport airspace due to emergency conditions on the ground;
372
 regulating or limiting 
the interstate, instrastate or foreign transportation of, or providing for the inspection, 
cleaning or destruction of, animals, food, and other property found to be 
contaminated or infected;
373
 and, limiting the liability of those administering 
emergency countermeasures or those volunteers participating in emergency aid.
374
   
C. Current Application to Emergencies 
There are five foundational functions of public health that must be generally 
observed by the active Executive (or even state or local government) during a public 
health crisis.
375
 The most important is preparedness through public health emergency 
planning and exercises.
376
 The meticulously planned response to a disaster will 
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safeguard the common good and restore the lost equilibrium.
377
 Secondly, 
surveillance requires the establishment of reasonable measures to not only detect, but 
track emergencies that may arise or that have occurred.
378
 This will aid in the 
prevention or reduction of the traumatic effects of an emergency by immediately 
addressing and directing public safety concerns.
379
 Third, is the management of 
healthcare property by securing the availability of vaccines, pharmaceuticals and 
hospitals to ensure that these measures do not become overwhelmed during the 
crisis.
380
 Fourth, protection of persons by compelling, when clearly necessary, 
vaccinations, testing, treatment, isolation, and quarantine will help reduce the spread 
of contagion.
381
 Finally, communication with the public is paramount. Ensuring that 
unambiguous and authoritative information reaches the public at large in a timely 
manner will go a long way towards maintaining calm and public safety.
382
 
The appropriate division of these responsibilities during an emergency health 
disaster is crucial to the successful response of local and state authorities.
383
 Take for 
instance the public health emergency scenario of a breakout of a virulent, contagious 
disease. A decision is raised whether the Executive will need to order the medical 
examination, vaccination, treatment or, worse case scenario, limited or widespread 
quarantine of the populace.
384
 In these instances where the Executive action may be 
tantamount to mandatory compulsion against civil liberties, an effective leader will 
be able to preserve the public health and welfare better, faster, and more adequately 
than an ineffective leader. ―Free people respond to leadership much more vigorously 
than a people held in place by power, fear and terror of their own government.‖385  
As was agreed by a group of attorneys, academics, and government officials, 
―[c]lear, open, and lawful response by government officials is necessary for public 
support and preservation of our national values. Rapid determination of the 
appropriate balance between coercive government action and individual civil rights 
is critical‖386 According to Professor Smith, ―public health ethics requires inherently 
at-risk individuals to suffer elements of harm—through isolation, quarantine, or 
compulsory vaccination—in order to advance the public good and secure the public-
at-large from exposure to the spread of an infectious disease.‖387 Smith goes on to 
state that: 
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[b]ecause of the chaos a pandemic is likely to bring, a strategy that 
focuses on benefiting society at large is a useful one, however, it must 
also be ―guided by a spirit of humanism‖ and not eliminate autonomy 
altogether in the process. . . . During a dire situation like a pandemic, with 
thousands of citizens becoming stricken with a deadly influenza virus, 
rationing health care and medical resources will not only be necessary, 
but it will be just if applied correctly.
 388
 
Timorous action can result in the spread of infectious disease and related deaths.
389
 
For instance, if an influenza pandemic occurred, sixty-two million people would 
succumb and die nationally, and 89,000 to 207,000 people of the U.S. population 
would die.
390
 To prevent losses of this magnitude, the Executive may be required to 
approve the infringement of individual liberties in order to immediately safeguard 
the lives of the many.
391
 This is a challenge that no one person should have to face.    
V. CONCLUSION – THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY AS A GLOSS ON EXECUTIVE POWERS 
It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than 
the security of the Nation.
392
  
 
The authority for the President to act immediately in response to an emergency 
arises out of the principle of necessity.
393
 ―[A] military commander should be able to 
use available resources to alleviate human suffering, without first requiring a 
bureaucratic permission slip.‖394 As stated previously, necessity is a prerequisite for 
presidential action.
395
 According to Thomas Jefferson, the laws of necessity or even 
those of self-preservation, which necessitate the immediate action to preserve the 
safety of our country when in danger, are of the highest obligation.  
To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be 
to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are 
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. . . . 
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk 
himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the Constitution, and 
his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. . . . The line of 
discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is 
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bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his 
country and the rectitude of his motives.
396
 
Jefferson recognized the concept of necessity as a by-product of self-preservation.
397
  
Without necessity, there is a heightened potential for the abuse of presidential 
authority.
398
 Chief Justice Stone in Kahanamoku directed that ―[the] executive has 
broad discretion in determining when the public emergency is such as to give rise to 
the necessity.‖399 The determination that an emergency exists is a decision 
exclusively resting with the President.
400
 
The Court expressed its rational fear that civil liberties may be laid by the 
roadside in the expression of presidential authority in times of emergencies.
401
 ―[A]n 
executive, acting pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority may, consistent 
with the Due Process Clause, unilaterally decide to detain an individual if the 
executive deems this necessary for the public safety even if he is mistaken.‖402 A 
historical record has shown, so long as the Executive proceeds under a a good faith 
basis, his reasonable actions in limiting the rights of this individual will be 
constitutionally upheld.
403
  
Despite its reservations, the Court has dismissed any possibility of ―executive 
tyranny‖404 in the existence of a showing of necessity. ―Any ambiguities in the 
allocation of a power that is executive in nature . . . must be resolved in favor of the 
executive branch.‖405 Any individual who acts on the principle of necessity in an 
emergency scenario is presumed to act in the interest of the populace rather than in 
furtherance of his own ambitions.
406
 ―A rigorous adherent to the demands of 
individual rights, however, will strike the balance with greater weight to the 
language of rights than to the language of power.‖407 The Founders intended to 
create a government that was ―cloathed [sic] with all the powers requisite to [the] 
                                                          
 396 Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 336 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
 400 Id. 
 401 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 591; Davies, supra note 55, at 111. 
 402 Hamdi, 343 U.S. at 590. 
 403 See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J. 
concurring). Executive action to nationalize certain steel mills ahead of a steel strike to 
support wartime munitions was struck down because the authority was vested in the 
legislature. See id. The Court found that, to support the Executive action, the authority must 
have originated within the constitution, congress must have delegated authority to the 
executive, or the constitution must be silent on the issue. Id. 
 404 Id at 582. 
 405 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 494. 
 406 Davies, supra note 55, at 112. 
 407  See McCormack, supra note 160, at 139. 
2012] EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE 305 
 
complete execution of its trust.‖408 This trust is necessary for the security of the 
nation.
409
 
During the 1980s, the AIDS crisis became full blown.
410
 Amidst heightened 
fears, the prospect of quarantine returned to the national perspective.
411
 Relatively 
unknown at the time, AIDS was ―unlike any disease recently faced by man.‖412 
Although AIDS is incurable and, at the time invariably fatal, victims could be 
asymptomatic carriers for all of their lives.
413
 Indeed infected individuals posed no 
hazard to those with whom they did not have sexual relations, share blood, or other 
bodily fluid, or IV needles.
414
 In such a unique public health epidemic, where the 
exact nature of the crisis is unknown or the results indeterminable, the Executive 
must inevitably weigh the interest in protecting the public health against the 
fundamental deprivation of civil liberties.
415
  
Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly portrayed the struggle to uphold civil rights 
alongside the Executive authority in his book ―All the Laws But One.‖416 According 
to Chief Justice Rehnquist, ―[i]t is both desirable and likely that more careful 
attention will be paid by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of 
necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent . . . but 
they will speak with a somewhat different voice.‖417 History dictates that under 
Executive discretion, ―the necessity for action in a manifest emergency will permit 
exercise of granted powers in unusual ways that may threaten individual liberties.‖418 
As this Article contends, it is clear that the President is inherently granted with 
the powers to unilaterally act to protect and control the national security and interests 
of the United States.
419
 Some powers may not be explicitly spelled out, and instead, 
may be implicit.
420
 This is so because ―[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, 
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the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the 
exercise of power by a single hand.‖421 When necessary to preserve and protect the 
safety and integrity of the United States and its responsibilities and obligations as a 
sovereign nation, the President‘s powers are the broadest.422 
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